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The Technology of Political
Communication:
R. v. Bryan and the Knowledgeable
Voter in the 21st Century
Richard Haigh
… the world of the third millennium is inevitably, is ineradicably
modern, and … it is our intellectual duty to submit to that modernity,
and to dismiss as sentimental and inherently fraudulent all yearnings
for what is dubiously termed the “original”.
Julian Barnes — London, London

I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development and prevalence of new information and
communication technologies have radically reshaped the “interplay”
between democracy and communication. It is no longer advisable to
separate the study of democracy from a study of technological expansion.
The growth and merger of the information and communication industries
has changed the very meaning of democracy. Successive Canadian
governments have articulated a vision of being known around the world
as the government most connected to its citizens.1
Arguably, the Internet enables citizens to become more informed
and more engaged participants in the development and maintenance of a
social and political identity. However, it may well be a victim of its own
success. As with the question whether a tree falling in a forest makes a
sound without a listener there to hear it, it is now not too far-fetched to
ask whether information that is not retrievable via a keyword-search and

Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Many thanks to Orna Fogel, Queen’s LLB
(expected 2008) for her excellent research assistance; Michael Sobkin, Jacqueline Krikorian,
Warren Newman and Charlotte Davis for suggestions and comments on an earlier draft.
1
Canada, Speech from the Throne to open the second session, 36th Parliament of Canada,
October 12 (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1999).
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logarithmic equation from the index of a popular search-engine, actually
exists. There is a growing movement, perhaps generational,2 that
believes all knowledge will soon be available on the Internet, that
information is less valuable if it is not on the Internet, and that access to
the Internet is a prerequisite to being a fully informed citizen.
Like older technologies such as radio and television, the Internet
serves to facilitate and mediate technology. Unlike older forms of
communication, however, the nature of computers and networks means
that they can serve as both an information retrieval system and
communication device. They allow for the simultaneous reception and
production of information. Computers have the power to make
individuals publishers, broadcasters, commentators, analysts, readers,
viewers and listeners. At the same time, as with any powerful institution,
the Internet is not value- or ideology-free. It delivers information with
ready-made cultural assumptions, biases and slants. In other words, it
can determine culture simply by the way the information is encoded and
transmitted.
Moreover, the Internet can be socially isolating. Those who regularly
access the Internet3 risk removing themselves from a physical agora into
an e-gora. Instead of face-to-face transactions, they can become
increasingly dependent on the Internet for community. Evidence exists
that this is happening. Chat rooms, blogs, website memberships, online
dating sites, Facebook and other social networking sites are now
mediating many elements of social interaction. More and more political
and social discussion occurs via online communities. All this raises
potential questions: does debate and discussion occur differently in an
online community? Is there less opportunity for dissenting views
amongst homogeneous online communities? Or a stratification of
viewpoints? In other words, does the Internet frustrate rather than
promote informed political debate?
Coupled with this socio-cultural reformation is the Internet’s
technical complexity. The vast majority of the people who use it have no
idea how it works. Control over carriage is largely left to technicians and
2
There is a lot of popular literature on “Generation Y” (those born between 1975 and
1990) and how they think and work differently. For example, see Virginia Galt, “The Generational
Divide” The Globe and Mail, March 31, 2004, at C1.
3
Of course, there are still a large number of Canadians who do not enjoy regular access to
computers. But the numbers are obviously growing: recent statistics show 20.45 million users, which is
equivalent to 63.5 per cent of the total population. 53.6 per cent of Canadians connect to the Internet
using a type of high-speed connection, compared to 33.8 per cent in the U.S. — see Statistics Canada,
Household Internet Use Survey, <http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/040708/d040708a.htm>.
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industry experts, as opposed to government officials. In part, this has
allowed it to flourish and grow to an unimaginable size in little more
than a decade. But it also, so far, has made maintaining government
control over content very difficult.
These issues provide a backdrop to the recent ruling of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Bryan.4 This paper examines the case and
explores it in the context of new technology, focusing on the following
two matters: whether the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the law prohibiting the premature transmission of
election results ignores the practical realities of new media (and possible
unknown media inventions in the future) and its own trend-setting
decisions in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)5
and Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v.
Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers;6 and given this modern
information age, the nature of section 1 analysis, and possible reforms of
the Oakes test, to address the influence of technology on legal rights.
These will be discussed after a brief review of the case.

II. THE POLLS ARE CLOSED IN HALIFAX —
DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOUR VOTER IS?
In 2000 Paul Bryan, a software designer from British Columbia,
launched a website which he eponymously titled “Bryan’s Election
Results Canada”.7 The website was used as a vehicle to discuss thencurrent Canadian politics and the upcoming November federal election.
On the site, Bryan advertised that he intended to post the Atlantic
Canada election results on his webpage immediately after the polls there
closed, in direct contravention of section 329 of the Canada Elections
Act.8
By that time the Act had been modified to follow, at least in part, the
recommendations of the 1991 report of the Royal Commission on
4

[2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”].
[1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”].
6
[2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “SOCAN”].
7
See <http://www.electionresultscanada.com>. See also Canadian Press, “Supreme Court
to Rule on Election Result Blackout” Toronto Star, March 14, 2007, online: Toronto Star
<http://www.thestar.com/News/article/191832>.
8
See Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 329 [hereinafter “Act”]: “No person shall
transmit the result or purported result of the vote in an electoral district to the public in another
electoral district before the close of all of the polling stations in that other electoral district.”
5
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Electoral Reform and Party Financing (“Lortie Commission”).9 The
report, a two-volume compendium, provides a comprehensive assessment
of Canada’s electoral process. It makes a number of recommendations
related to federal elections, on topics such as the right to be a candidate,
the role and the financing of political parties, election expense controls,
public funding, disclosure, enforcement and broadcasting. One of the
specific recommendations that was adopted provides for staggered
opening and closing hours of various polling stations across Canada in
order to minimize the effects that our multiple time zones have on the
availability of election results. Because a significant number of ridings
are concentrated in central time zones, the Act was amended to change
the opening times of polls in Ontario and Quebec so that they are open
from 9:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., while the westernmost ridings (B.C. and
some of Alberta) now open at 7 a.m. and close at 7 p.m. (Atlantic
Canada polls remaining the same at 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.). The delay in
closure of the polls in the central time zones ensures that it will be
impossible for the ultimate result of a federal election to be determined
before the polls close in British Columbia.10 The new hours do not,
however, prevent the results of Atlantic Canada from being available
before the polls close in the West. Section 329 (first enacted under a
different statutory provision in 1938) was not amended, thus maintaining
the ban on the transmission of election results from areas where the polls
had closed to time zones where the polls had not yet closed. The Act
establishes that anyone breaching section 329 is liable to a summary
conviction offence punishable by a fine not exceeding $25,000.
Ignoring the warning of then-Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre
Kingsley (who had got wind of Bryan’s intention), on election night
Bryan posted the results of Atlantic Canada before the polls in British
Columbia and parts of Alberta had closed. He was charged under the
Act. Although he conceded that he had breached section 329 by posting
these early results, he challenged the law as breaching his section 2(b)
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms right to freedom of
expression.11 The case made its way through the British Columbia courts,

9

Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral
Democracy: Proposed Legislation (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1991)
[hereinafter “Lortie Report”].
10
Bryan, supra, note 4, at paras. 47, 87.
11
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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variably winning and losing, before reaching the Supreme Court.12 Since
the ban effectively only covers the results from Atlantic Canada,13 the
specific issue for the Supreme Court was whether the publication of such
results before the polls in Western Canada close can be restricted or
whether that is an unjustifiable breach of freedom of expression under
section 2(b).
The Supreme Court decision consists of three separate concurring
judgments upholding the law (on behalf of a majority of five judges) and
a single dissenting judgment of four judges. All nine judges agreed that
section 2(b) of the Charter was breached. The differences play out in the
section 1 analysis. Justice Bastarache (Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein
JJ., concurring in a separate judgment), suggests that potential voters
who know in advance the results of Atlantic Canada could sway voting
patterns or be discouraged from voting.14 One of his key concerns is that
the publication of these results would make the system appear unfair to
voters because westerners would have the advantage of knowing the
result of some votes from another part of the country, while eastern
voters could never enjoy the same advantage. Even if this informational
inequality had no actual effect on voting patterns, it could shake the
confidence Canadians have in the electoral system generally; for him,
legitimacy depends as much on perception as reality.15
Both Bastarache J. and Fish J. (in a separate opinion also concurred
separately by Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ.) discuss the
difficulty and complexity of the section 1 analysis and the need to
contextualize requirements of proof in cases such as this. Justice
Bastarache proceeds through a detailed analysis of the four contextual
factors (from Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)16 and Thomson
Newspapers) that situate the legislation’s infringement of section 2(b)
rights: (i) the nature of the harm and the inability to measure it; (ii) the
vulnerability of the group protected; (iii) the subjective fears and
apprehension of harm that result; and (iv) the nature of the infringed
12
R. v. Bryan, [2003] B.C.J. No. 318, 2003 BCPC 39 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) (application to
declare s. 329 of the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional dismissed); R. v. Bryan, [2003] B.C.J.
No. 2479, 2003 BCSC 1499 (B.C.S.C.) (acquittal from criminal conviction because of
unconstitutional breach of s. 2(b) of the Charter by s. 329 of Canada Elections Act); R. v. Bryan,
[2005] B.C.J. No. 1130, 2005 BCCA 285 (B.C.C.A.) (appeal allowed).
13
Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 95.
14
Id., at para. 14; see also para. 19, where Bastarache J. says that logic and common sense
must be relied upon since predicting voter actions is almost impossible.
15
Id., at paras. 17, 30 (per Bastarache J.); paras. 62, 78 (per Fish J.).
16
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”].
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activity (political expression).17 For Bastarache J., the uncertainty of
social science evidence allows the Court to rely, as it did in Harper, on
logic and reason assisted by social science evidence to prove harm.18 He
concludes his review of the contextual factors by observing:
… I note that vulnerability does not play a major part in the analysis,
but in light of the fact that prevention of Canadians’ subjective fears
and apprehension of harm is a goal of s. 329, evidence of those
subjective fears must be taken as important. While political expression
is undoubtedly important, the right at issue is the putative right to
receive election results before the polls close; restricting access to such
information before polls close carries less weight than after they close.
Furthermore, it has not been established that a right to such information,
which is at the periphery of the s. 2(b) guarantee, has been breached.19

He then proceeds effortlessly through the section 1 justificatory
factors from Oakes. A low evidentiary standard is adopted: the first step,
although not an “evidentiary contest”, requires only that an objective be
“asserted” by government in order for it to be accepted by the Court as
pressing and substantial;20 the next step, rational connection, becomes
“eminently clear” based on reason or logic; minimal impairment is
assessed partly through logic and reason (which constitute “appropriate
supplements to what evidence there is”);21 and finally, since the ban is
the only effective response available to Parliament and 70 per cent of
Canadians believe in the importance of informational equality, logic and
reason suggest that section 329 contributes in a salutary way to public
confidence in the electoral system.22 In other words, none of the steps
requires evidence more rigorous than logic or reason.
Probably as a result of the dissent’s focus on proportionality, Fish J.
added further reasons to the section 1 justifications provided by
Bastarache J., specifically on the balance between deleterious and
salutary effects of the legislative provisions. For him, the efficacy of the
prohibition — i.e., does it affect the election outcome? — was of little
relevance: the short delay was either effective in addressing information
imbalance if premature release of information would affect the result, or
17
18
19
20
21
22

Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 10.
Id., at para. 16.
Id., at para. 30.
Id., at paras. 32, 34.
Id., at para. 43.
Id., at para. 49.
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it was effective in addressing the perception of unfairness if there was no
effect.23 Harm arose regardless; there were simply two different types of
harm. That also helped Fish J. lower the evidentiary standard (in the
absence of definitive scientific evidence of harm) to rely on “logic,
reason and some social science evidence”.24 In the end, for him, the
salutary effects of the legislation outweighed any deleterious effects.
Although he recognized that salutary effects may be diminished
somewhat by technology (citing the possibility of circumventing the
prohibition through telephone and e-mail communications), these were
dismissed as minimal, being primarily local and not having widespread
effect. At the same time, the deleterious effects of the delay, due solely
to the short duration of the publication ban, were slight.
Justice Fish concluded his reasons by turning the media intervenors’
arguments against themselves. (A number of major media conglomerates
intervened, including CBC, CTV, Rogers Broadcasting, CHUM, Sun
Media, Globe and Mail, and CanWest Media.) Although their position
was similar to that relied upon in Thomson Newspapers — that voters
had a right to as much information as possible regarding the election of
their future government in order to make informed and strategic voting
choices — they also assumed that the premature publication of Atlantic
election results would have an effect on other voters’ choices.25 Their
point was that voters have the right to allow such information to affect
their choices. Justice Fish held that this illustrates perfectly that western
Canadians could be influenced how and even whether to vote.26
Justice Abella wrote the dissent on behalf of McLachlin C.J.C.,
Binnie and LeBel JJ. The key issue for the minority was the sufficiency
of the government’s evidence justifying the breach of section 2(b). In the
final analysis, Abella J. found that the government had not provided
reasoned demonstration that the benefits of the limitation outweighed its
harmful effects. Her assessment was harsh: “[a]ny evidence of harm to
23

Id., at para. 66.
Id., at para. 69.
25
See Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5. Bryan is not an example of the Court
overruling itself or being inconsistent with the doctrine of stare decisis — technically the ban on
polling (which was at issue in Thomson Newspapers) is still in effect on the day of voting. Bryan
makes much less sense if the Court’s concern is with strategic voting. The main problem, however,
was not over people voting strategically — it was with voters not having equal access to information
that allows them to vote strategically (information equality). Unlike Western Canadian voters,
voters in the Atlantic provinces do not have the benefit of results from elsewhere in order to vote
strategically.
26
Bryan, supra, note 4, at para. 77.
24
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the public’s perception or conduct in knowing the election results from
Atlantic Canada before they vote is speculative, inconclusive and largely
unsubstantiated.”27 She also argued that the majority overvalued the
evidence. For her, prior publication of election results has only been
shown to affect voter behaviour where it deals with the likely outcome
of the entire election, i.e., not just results from a small number of ridings
which will be inconclusive to the result as a whole. Given Canada’s
unequally distributed population, results from Atlantic Canada are
unlikely to have any predictive value. In other words, for the minority
there was nothing in the evidence to suggest an inherently harmful effect
attributable to the mere presence of an information imbalance.28 They
accepted that scientific proof of this premise is unavailable; however,
there must still be a “reasoned or logical basis” for assessing the validity
of a claim that the harm created by protecting expression outweighs the
benefits of information equality. In fact, the minority concluded that
there was no demonstrated benefit to the limitation at all.29
In sum, Bryan continues the long history of a Supreme Court divided
over expressive rights, particularly in the nature and operation of section
1 in the face of breaches of those rights.30 The next section looks in more
detail at that divide in the context of modern technology.

III. BRYAN IN CONTEXT
1. On Modernization, Technology and Community
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that legitimacy and popular
opinion are connected. In R. v. Burlingham,31 L’Heureux-Dubé J., albeit
27

Id., at para. 107 (emphasis added).
Id., at paras. 117, 120.
29
Id., at para. 132.
30
It is also another case dealing with the constitutionality of some aspect of elections, or
democratic process problems as they are known. Colin Feasby has written a number of articles on
this issue: see, for example, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process”
(2005) S.C.L.R. (2d) 237; “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Political Theory and the
Constitutionality of the Political Finance Regime” in K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, eds., Party
Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006);
and “Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” (2007) 45(3)
Osgoode Hall L.J. 513. Feasby has made the point on a number of occasions that Parliament is often
in a conflict of interest position when it comes to crafting laws dealing with the democratic process;
and a court assessing contextual factors related to deference should be mindful of this. However, in
the above-noted 2007 article he observes that Bryan is different in that there is no inherent conflict
of interest in MPs wishing to restrict the access of westerners to eastern election results (at 543).
31
[1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
28
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in the context of section 24(2) of the Charter with its requirement for
maintaining the repute of the administration of justice, noted the
importance of the link between legitimacy and public opinion:
… in the application and enforcement of our laws, our constitutional
values [should] neither run too far ahead nor lag too far behind our
basic values as a society. One of [s. 24’s] purposes is therefore to
ensure that the institution charged with upholding those fundamental
values does not lose legitimacy in the eyes of those whose values it is
entrusted to protect.32

In Vriend v. Alberta33 Iacobucci J. took this concept a little further, by
recognizing that the courts are not isolated from society at large: “hardly
a day goes by without some comment or criticism to the effect that under
the Charter courts are wrongfully usurping the role of the legislatures.”34
Later on, Bastarache J., speaking extra-judicially, remarked that it is
essential that the Supreme Court not be out of step with the general
public, identifying links between public scrutiny, public opinion and
legitimacy.35 Of course, as the Supreme Court has often noted (particularly
in the criminal law context), it is sometimes necessary for the protection
of fundamental values for a court to go against the tides of public
opinion.36 The balance is therefore a delicate one; but at a minimum we
have moved beyond hearing complaints that high court pronouncements
are obscure and of marginal relevance to the general public.37
Another marker of legitimacy is currency. There are signs here too
that the Court is striving to embrace modernism; in some aspects it is
almost presenting itself as fashionable. For example, on its current
website,38 there are links to such pages as “Client Satisfaction Surveys”, a

32

Id., at para. 72.
[1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.).
34
Id., at para. 130.
35
C. Schmitz, quoting Bastarache J., “Justice: Top Court Goes ‘Too Far’” Ottawa Citizen,
January 13, 2001, at A7.
36
See, for example, R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at paras. 50, 128
(S.C.C.).
37
See, for example, Gareth Evans, “The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the
Constitution in a Changing Society” in A.D. Hambly & J.D. Goldring, eds., Australian Lawyers and
Social Change (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1976) 13, at 74.
38
See <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index_e.asp>. Websites are no longer optional
for virtually all businesses, government institutions and agencies. A brief, random, Internet search
shows websites exist for the following national courts: Fiji, China, India, Venezuela and Pakistan
(Lahore). On the other hand, decisions of Qatar courts are not published, so there is at least one court
without a website — see <http://www.qatarlaw.com/English/sys4.htm>.
33
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“Court Modernization Project” and “Proactive Disclosure”.39 Chief Justice
McLachlin appears strikingly in a white suit on the home page — and you
can even click on the photograph to view “image details”. Some businesses
and institutions could learn from the Court’s functional and logical
website design (including Bryan’s own “ElectionResultsCanada.com”).
However, most corporate and institutional websites are never far
from being marketing and propaganda vehicles. To assess fully whether
an institution such as the Supreme Court is keeping up with the times,
one must scratch beneath the surface. A website is mainly gloss. The real
test of a court’s understanding of, and attitude towards, technology must
be determined from its decisions.
What, then, of the Bryan decision? The majority shied away from
dealing with technology and its effect on communication and expression.
Were they frightened of, or ill-informed about, the world of modern
technology? Is the Court inadvertently showing its age? If so, will this
detract from its legitimacy as a public institution?
Let us first go back three years before Bryan. In SOCAN, the Court
was forced to deal with technology head-on. At issue was who should
compensate composers and artists for Canadian copyright in music
downloaded in Canada from Internet websites located elsewhere. Justice
Binnie, representing an eight-member majority of the Court (including
Bastarache and Fish JJ.) held that Parliament did not intend the
Copyright Act40 to make Internet intermediaries (such as Internet service
providers) “users” so as to be subject to royalties for copyright infringement.
The majority engaged in a deep analysis of problems caused by the
wired world, acknowledging that times have changed “when it is as easy
to access a website hosted by a server in Bangalore as it is in Mississauga”.41
In a lengthy discussion on the finer points of Internet protocols and
delivery mechanisms, the majority exhibited a detailed, technical knowledge
of the engineering behind the Internet.42 After concluding on that point,
Binnie J. went on, noting some of the Internet’s social and cultural effects:
… The capacity of the Internet to disseminate “works of the arts and
intellect” is one of the great innovations of the information age …
39
It is comforting to know that McLachlin C.J.C. has only relied on the (at best) inelegant
word “proactive” on two occasions: RJR-Macdonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J.
No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 158 (S.C.C.) and Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] S.C.J. No. 14,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 58 (S.C.C.).
40
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
41
SOCAN, [2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
42
See id., at paras. 17-26.
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[The much larger conundrum is] trying to apply national laws to
a fast-evolving technology that in essence respects no national
boundaries. … The issue of global forum shopping for actions for
Internet torts has scarcely been addressed. The availability of child
pornography on the Internet is a matter of serious concern. E-commerce
is growing. Internet liability is thus a vast field where the legal harvest
is only beginning to ripen.43

And then:
… The velocity of new technical developments in the computer industry,
and the rapidly declining cost to the consumer, is legendary. Professor
Takach has unearthed the startling statistic that if the automobile industry
was able to achieve the same performance-price improvements as has the
computer chip industry, a car today would cost under five dollars and
would get 250,000 miles to the gallon of gasoline …44

Here, therefore, is a situation where the Court evinces a very adept
appreciation of technology in general and the Internet in particular.
Obviously the basis of the litigation in SOCAN made it impossible to
duck the issue of technology. But even if on one level Bryan is a
straightforward matter of a person disobeying a clear law, making waves
for his own self-aggrandizement (which Bryan surely was), the Court’s
awkwardness in handling the technology issue belies its earlier deftness
in SOCAN. It now seems slightly out of touch with reality; the Supreme
Court “just doesn’t get it”.
To begin, there is evidence in the text itself. Justice Fish states:
I recognize, of course, that modern communications technology
diminishes the delay’s effectiveness and thereby its salutary effects.
Section 329 cannot and does not entirely prevent voters in Central or
Western Canada who are determined to learn before casting their
ballots what has transpired in the Atlantic provinces from obtaining
that information by telephone or e-mail, for example. But it does, at the
very least, curb widespread dissemination of this information and it
contributes materially in this way to its objective — information
equality between voters in different parts of the country.45

Justice Fish’s “modern technology” examples, particularly the telephone
(what about a fax machine?), do not help cement the image of a court
embracing technology. Where is the “legal harvest” as Binnie J., in his
inimitable way, puts it? Is Fish J. not aware of social networking
43
44
45

Id., at paras. 40, 41.
Id., at para. 114.
Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
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software, or texting or other more rapid and widespread forms of
“guerilla” communication? One begins to wonder whether the majority
is scared of technology or displaying a lack of understanding of it,
neither of which help establish the Court’s legitimacy nor currency. Of
course, parsing a small passage of Fish J.’s decision for evidence of a
more general conservativism may be making too much of it — he did
mention “e-mail” after all.
More important is the Court’s institutional epistemology. What
happened in the three years after SOCAN to bring out such apprehension
in Bryan? The Court seems to go from being hip to hidebound in two
steps. In Bryan it throws up its hands in apparent surrender, refusing to
acknowledge the enormous impact current technology has on the social
and cultural ordering of society. Its main source of knowledge is a 16year-old government study. In 1991 there was no e-mail, no Google, no
YouTube, no iPod or MP3s. No one knew about fantasy and social
networking games such as Avalon, EverQuest and Second Life. And it
would have been impossible to fathom that someone in one of these
games, portraying a virtual realtor, could become an actual millionaire
through such virtual sales.46 It is not too harsh to say, therefore, that in
this case, the majority is deeply out of touch with reality.
Election polling and election results are part of a very different
world in 2007. Given the divergent opinions in the Bryan and SOCAN
cases, it is not clear why the Court would ignore many relevant
technological factors. That is putting it at its mildest. More distressing is
the possibility that the Court simply selects whether it wants to be up-todate or out-of-touch. Given its apparent comfort with technology,
nuanced understanding of modernity and finely tuned approach to legal
decision-making in a globally wired world that it displayed in SOCAN,
the more cynical view does not seem too far-fetched.
What might have been useful to review in Bryan? For one, social
network websites such as Facebook,47 MySpace,48 Flickr,49 Friendster,50
46

Anshe Chung is apparently the first person to make one million real-world dollars through
her virtual real estate transactions and holdings. (I must confess that I cannot comprehend how this
works.)
47
Online: <http://www.facebook.com>. Facebook and MySpace are the most popular sites.
According to “Inside Facebook” as of September 2007, there were 42 million Facebook members, a
doubling from approximately 20 million in September 2006. (See <http://www.insidefacebook.com/
2007/09/25/new-numbers-on-facebook-platform-growth/>.) MySpace boasts over 106 million
members — see Alexa:the Web Information Company at <http://www.alexa.com>.
48
Online: <http://www.MySpace.com>.
49
Online: <http://www.flickr.com>.
50
Online: <http://www.friendster.com>.
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LinkedIn,51 Bebo52 and Twitter53 are important communicative tools today.
They are fast becoming powerful forces in their own right, gaining
attention as phenomena worthy of study. According to the New York
Times:
Each day about 1,700 juniors at East Coast college log on to
Facebook.com to accumulate “friends”, compare movie preferences,
share videos and exchange cybercocktails and kisses. Unwittingly,
these students have become the subjects of academic research. To
study how personal tastes, habits and values affect the formation of
social relationships (and how social relationships affect tastes, habits
and values), a team of researchers from Harvard and the University of
California, Los Angeles, are monitoring the Facebook profiles of an
entire class of students at one college …54

The researchers have found that social networks are a form of living,
breathing entities that reproduce and have a collective memory, a sense
of purpose, and can achieve things differently from what the individual
members can on their own.55
In the digital age, social networks are not only massive and
ubiquitous, but they are also much easier to follow. People leave digital
traces of where they are and who they are interacting with; huge amounts
of data are retained that can be used to investigate fundamental questions
about social organization, human behaviour and group dynamics. At the
same time, these networks are much more complex than traditional social
relationships. As Nicholas Christakis, the Harvard sociologist, notes:
[I]t is a very, very fundamental observation that things happening in a
social space beyond your vision — events that occur or choices that are
made by people you don’t know — can cascade in a conscious or
subconscious way through a network and affect you. This is a very
profound and fundamental observation about the operation of social
life … [W]e have found substantial evidence for the … spread of
norms …
Now we are talking about the flow of tastes in privacy through the
network. And tastes in all kinds of other things, like music, movies, or
51

Online: <http://www.linkedin.com>.
Online: <http://www.bebo.com>.
53
Online: <http://www.twitter.com>.
54
Stephanie Rosenbloom, “On Facebook, Scholars Link up With Data” New York Times,
December 17, 2007.
55
See The Edge, “Social Networks are Like the Eye: A Talk with Nicholas A. Christakis”,
February 25, 2008, online: <http://www.edge.org>.
52
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books, or a taste in food. Or a flow of altruism through the network.
All of these kinds of things can flow through social networks and obey
certain rules we are seeking to discover.56

The implication that these sites and this research has for a lowly
provision such as section 329 of the Canada Elections Act is clear.
Social networks and networking sites function incredibly rapidly in ways
that we are barely beginning to understand. They operate with little
regulatory control. They can disseminate hard facts and basic information,
but also behaviours, norms and tastes.
Moreover, they can be quite insidious. Unlike Bryan’s clumsy
attempt to alert the public to his website postings, social networks can
move quickly through vastly disparate groups. For example, one
Facebook group of politically interested members could send the
Atlantic Canada poll results to their “friends”, who could then forward to
a new subgroup of “friends” and so on. Given that the average Facebook
member has between 150 and 200 friends, it would not take long at all
for potential recipients to number in the millions.57
Although the minority in Bryan paid heed to the reality of
technology and the need to assess the effectiveness of a publication ban
in an era where circumventing it is made relatively easy by technology,
it also shied away from acknowledging the revolutionary nature of social
networking sites (though it did not need to in order to reach its
determination).58 The majority, however, appeared old-fashioned. It
made little effort to understand technology in general and social
networks in particular. By standing on a principle of informational
equality, in the midst of today’s culture of information sharing, it ends
up standing on an island in a tsunami. If not yet precarious, this is a
position that cannot long remain viable.59
56
Id., at 9. See Nicholas Christakis & James Fowler, “The Spread of Obesity in a Large
Social Network over 32 Years” (2007) 357 New Engl. J. Med. 370.
57
For statistical information about Facebook, see N.B. Ellison, C. Steinfield, & C. Lampe,
“The benefits of Facebook ‘friends:’ Social capital and college students’ use of online social network
sites” (2007) 12(4) J. Computer-Mediated Communication, article 1, online at <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/
vol12/ issue4/ellison.html>.
58
See Bryan, supra, note 45, at paras. 123-24. Justice Abella referred to the discussion of
technology found in the Lortie Commission (which was published in 1991!), Professor Waddell’s
observation of how e-mails, instant messages and phone text messaging can circumvent the
blackout, and Lamer C.J.C.’s conclusion in Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) regarding the difficulties of bans in the global electronic age.
59
A good example of the power and rapidity by which social networks can operate, and
one that illustrates what could occur in elections to come, relates to CBC’s recent decision to change
Radio 2’s program content. Within a few days of the announcement a Facebook “group” was
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2. The Continuing Saga of Section 1 Jurisprudence
As discussed above, the Court’s legitimacy can be harmed when it
ignores technological reality. This is exacerbated when added to a
decades old controversy at the Court regarding the proper approach to
take in determining justification for limits on rights under section 1 of
the Charter.
In a 2006 article,60 Professor Sujit Choudhry proposed two versions
of a “narrative” of the Oakes test: the first, dominant, narrative holds that
the uniform approach that Oakes established for assessing justifiable
limits was transformed into a categorization exercise, in which a search
for varying criteria of deference depending on context eventually
consumed the Court in doctrinal disagreements and difficulties. The
second, counter-narrative, lies in the disjunction between the need for
hard proof at each stage in the Oakes test, the reality of policy making
under conditions of factual uncertainty, and how the Court allocates risk
given such uncertainty. Bryan is an illustrative example of how these
two narratives can combine in surprising ways.
As Choudhry argues, the dominant narrative provides a legacy of
inscrutable and irreconcilable decisions. To begin, the Court in Oakes
rejects arguments about the efficaciousness of reverse onus provisions.
Less than 10 months later in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.61 the
Court accepts that simplicity and administrative convenience are
legitimate concerns in the proportionality analysis. The Court also
moves the analytical bar around. Under the minimal impairment stage of
the analysis, cases were distinguished based on the nature of “competing
interests”.62 Different outcomes arose depending on whether the state
acted on behalf of the whole community as a “singular antagonist” or on
behalf of third parties where it would mediate between competing

created to save Radio 2 (“Save Classical Music at CBC”). Within a matter of weeks, it had close to
12,000 members. Any news regarding CBC and Radio 2 can now be disseminated in an instant to all
these members (see John Doyle, “Note to classical music fans: Get Over Yourselves”, The Globe
and Mail, April 7, 2008, at R3). The repercussions for election results are obvious: election dates are
known in advance — a group of members could be set up well before the election date (call them
“Early Election Result Aficionados”). On the night of the election Atlantic Canada results could be
posted to all members within seconds after they are broadcast.
60
Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501 [hereinafter
“Choudhry”]. See also R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
61
[1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.).
62
Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 512.
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groups.63 Further refinements occurred by “elevat[ing] the interests of
third parties to the constitutional level, so that the state can be seen as
protecting their Charter rights by limiting the Charter rights of others”, 64
or by downgrading the importance of the constitutional right at stake in
some situations. Both methods are exemplified in R. v. Keegstra65 where
the right to freedom of expression of racial and religious minorities was
upgraded to protect victims from the harm of silencing at the same time
as hate speech was held to be peripheral to the core interests contained in
the fundamental freedom of expression. But even these refinements were
short-lived. In cases such as RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney
General)66 and R. v. Guignard67 the Court withdrew from its position of
distinguishing between core and peripheral speech.
Even more useful is Choudhry’s identification of the basic problem
of deference that bedevils the Court to this day: how the “contextualization”
of a problem can send deference in opposite directions. As he notes:
On the one hand, certain kinds of speech have been criminalized with
the possibility of imprisonment, and therefore on Irwin Toy attract the
highest standard of review under section 1. But on the other hand, the
speech in many cases has been peripheral, which argues for deference.68

As examples, he cites cases such as R v. Butler,69 the Prostitution
Reference70 and R. v. Sharpe71 in which the criminal nature of the
underlying offence was ignored while the low value of expression was
highlighted. He goes on:
This [failure to acknowledge the criminal side of the issue] is all the
more bizarre given that Irwin Toy itself raised this problem, because it
involved the regulation of commercial speech (warranting deference)
through a regime that created criminal sanctions, including imprisonment
(warranting no deference), albeit through provincial law. 72
63
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.). See Choudhry, id., at 512.
64
Choudhry, id., at 514 (emphasis in original).
65
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
66
[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.).
67
[2002] S.C.J. No. 16, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472 (S.C.C.).
68
Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 518.
69
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.).
70
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.).
71
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.).
72
Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 519.
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At present, the dominant narrative has the Court shying away from an
attempt to categorize the cases into discrete levels of deference, instead
relying on the same form of analysis but recasting them as factors
directing the appropriate judicial approach. Context becomes the new
category.
All of these same issues arise in Bryan. The publication ban
provision in the Act, breach of which gives rise to a summary conviction
offence punishable by a fine, places the state in the role of looking after
the entire community in the context of a federal election. At the same
time, the provision attempts to mediate between competing groups such
as individual voters located in different regions of the country,
communications and media institutions and political parties, to name but
a few. Moreover, the majority of the Court believed that the importance
of elevating electoral fairness outweighed the small, temporary harm to
freedom of expression. In this case, the majority creates a further
refinement to Choudhry’s dominant narrative. Here, the expression is not
downgraded by virtue of it being in the category of less valuable
expression (being political expression, that would be difficult to do) — it
is downgraded because (i) the quality of the expression changes depending
on who holds it;73 and (ii) the restriction is limited in duration. In other
words, a right can be situationally less important. The dissent, on the
other hand, stressed that political expression is at the “conceptual core”74
and receiving election results is a “core democratic right”,75 and an
“essential part of the democratic process”76 for which it is “difficult to
imagine a more important aspect”77 of the values protected by section 2(b).
Choudhry’s counter-narrative is equally germane. In this version, it
is the cogency of evidence that becomes critical to the approach to
section 1. Again, a history of conflicts within the Court is highlighted.
For example, the majority in RJR-MacDonald stressed the need for
“reasoned demonstration”78 of the “actual” connections, objectives,
benefits and seriousness79 under Oakes; in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief
73

See Bastarache J. in Bryan, supra, note 45, at para. 27 where he notes: “to suggest that
election results are an important political form of expression in the hands of those still to vote is to
prejudge the entire s. 1 inquiry” (emphasis in original).
74
Id., at para. 99.
75
Id., at para. 110.
76
Id.
77
Id., at para. 128.
78
RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 66, at para. 129.
79
Id., at para. 133.
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Electoral Officer)80 the majority insisted on avoiding “vague and
symbolic objectives”.81 The dissenting judges in each of these cases
expressed a serious concern that governments could be “paralyz[ed]”82
by such evidentiary requirements where there are “different social or
political philosophies upon which justifications for or against the
limitations of rights may be based”.83 As Choudhry notes, the fissures in
the Court in this version of the narrative centre on the kinds of inferences
governments can draw from inconclusive evidence84 and the circumstances
in which “logic” or “common sense” can be used to replace evidentiary
gaps.85
So it is no surprise that Professor Choudhry’s counter-narrative
appears in Bryan. Whereas the majority’s view is captured by Bastarache
J. stating “I am … forced to resort to logic and common sense applied to
the Attorney General’s evidence as proof of the harm of loss of public
confidence in the electoral system as a result of premature release of
results,”86 the dissent replies with “the evidence submitted by the
government in this case does not provide the requisite ‘reasoned
demonstration’ to justify infringing the right at stake to the extent that it
has”.87 The cogency of evidence is again at the heart of the disagreement.
What is a surprise is that Choudhry’s counter-narrative has become
part of the decision-making process itself, in a post-modernist, selfreflexive way. Now the Court is aware; Bastarache J. quotes directly
from Choudhry’s counter-narrative section, to bolster his own argument
for deference:
As Professor Choudhry aptly notes … :
Public policy is often based on approximations and extrapolations from
the available evidence, inferences from comparative data, and, on
occasion, even educated guesses. Absent a large-scale policy experiment,
this is all the evidence that is likely to be available. Justice La Forest
offered an observation in [McKinney …] which rings true: ‘[d]ecisions
on such matters must inevitably be the product of a mix of conjecture,

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

[2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé].
Id., at para. 22.
RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 66, at para. 67.
Sauvé, supra, note 78, at para. 67.
Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 527.
Id., at 528.
Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527, at para. 19 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 107.
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fragmentary knowledge, general experience and knowledge of the
needs, aspirations and resources of society’. 88

At the same time, the dissent continues to play its role in this narrative
by claiming
[W]hile scientific proof may not always be necessary or available, and
social science evidence supported by reason and logic can be relied
upon, the evidence must nonetheless establish the consequences of
imposing or failing to impose the limit.89

Unfortunately, neither side offers much in the way of a solution to this
impasse. In fairness to the judges, Choudhry left it open as well.90
I have two prescriptions to offer. First is to suggest that the Court
develop a form of best evidence rule for section 1 justifications. The
“best evidence rule” is a basic evidentiary common law rule that has
been around for a long time. As stated in Halsbury’s:
That evidence should be the best that the nature of the case will allow
is, besides being a matter of obvious prudence, a principle with a
considerable pedigree. However, any strict interpretation of this
principle has long been obsolete, and the rule is now only of
importance in regard to the primary evidence of private documents.
The logic of requiring the production of an original document where it
is available rather than relying on possibly unsatisfactory copies, or the

88

Id., at para. 29. See also Choudhry, supra, note 60, at 524.
Bryan, id., at para. 103 (Abella J.).
90
For a different interpretation of the “problems” of s. 1 jurisprudence in the context of
expressive rights, see R. Moon, “Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General
Approach to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 337. Moon argues that the twostep adjudicative model built into Charter adjudication (determination of a rights violation, then
justification under s. 1) may be part of the problem itself. As he notes at 365:
89

[I]n freedom of expression cases, the Court is not simply balancing separate interests and
giving priority to one value or right over another. Rather, it is making a complex
judgment about the realization of individual agency and identity in community life. It is
seeking to draw a line between expression that appeals to conscious reflection or
autonomous judgment and expression that seeks to manipulate. But there is no bright line
to be drawn. Where the Court draws the line will depend on contextual factors and their
impact on individual judgment. The strain on the Oakes test, as the Court attempts to fit
freedom of expression into the adjudicative structure … manifests itself in the broad
definition of the freedom’s scope and the deferential approach to limits under section 1.
Moon’s argument is a strong one. The arguments I make below are perhaps based on a pragmatic
view that for the foreseeable future we seem to be stuck with the two-step process and the Oakes
test, so we better make the best of it.
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recollections of witnesses, is clear, although modern techniques make
objections to the first alternative less strong. 91

It is normally a rule that applies to primary evidence in the context of a
trial. Moreover, as noted, it has undergone significant reforms and
watering-down from its earlier strict application. However, it could be a
useful principle to resurrect and modify so that it applies to secondary
sources used to assess a government’s section 1 justification. In this
context, Halsbury’s principle is still sound — the best evidence is the
path of prudence. In Bryan, the government’s evidence arguably was
feeble, and as noted earlier, out of touch with the modern electronic age.
The Court relied almost entirely on two sources: the Lortie Commission
report (which was the main source for both the majority and minority of
the Court) and a Decima Research/Carleton University study by Chris
Waddle entitled “Most Canadians Prefer Election Night Results
Blackout.”92 What about more comparative analyses? There are other
countries where time zones affect elections. For example, several U.S.
studies have attempted to estimate the impact that the early reporting of
projected outcomes has had on voter turnout. Many of these have found
the impact to be slight or negligible despite the fact that California, as
the most populous state, votes later.93 Or what about the independence of
the evidence? The Bryan court accepts the government’s own Lortie
Commission report as sufficient evidence to justify a breach of a right.
One need only compare the extreme care that the medical profession has
recently been forced to take in ensuring full disclosure of research
funding, editorial impartiality and publication integrity to understand the
need for similar controls in terms of section 1 justification. As Danielle
Pinard has previously noted, “the law can only ignore the empirical
realities of the outside world at the expense of its own credibility”.94 The
incredible expanse of the Internet and electronic era should, one would
91

Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 17, at 8. See also R. v. Papalia, [1979] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) (discussing the best evidence rule in the context of recorded
conversations where originals had been erased but copies were available).
92
The only other secondary sources relied upon in the decision were (what else!) Peter
Hogg’s Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2, loose-leaf ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997),
updated 2000, rel. 1 and Choudhry, supra, note 60.
93
See “Note — Exit Polls and the First Amendment” (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1927;
Anthony M. Barlow, “Restricting Election Day Exit Polling: Freedom of Expression vs. The Right
to Vote” (1990) 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1003, at 1005; L.K. Epstein & G. Strom, “Election Night
Projections and West Coast Turnout” (1981) 9 Am. Pol. Q. 479.
94
Danielle Pinard, “Charter and Context: The Facts for Which We Need Evidence, and the
Mysterious Other Ones” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163, at 172.
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think, give the Court access to both better and more likely impartial,
evidence. In this instance, common sense should become the last refuge
of the scoundrel (even a judicial one at that).
The second prescription is more modest. Perhaps what the Court is
really saying when it struggles over whether common sense, reason,
logic or cold, hard empirical evidence is necessary for a particular
section 1 analysis, is that, in most cases, the inferences that need to be
made are what Charles Pierce coined as abductive.95 I am not suggesting
a radical revisioning of section 1. Rather, the Court may find it useful to
examine the body of literature on abductive reasoning, as I believe it
would assist with an Oakes analysis, particularly in the need to consider
the thoroughness of the evidentiary record.
An abductive inference is simply a plausible inference arrived at
from a particular provision, not an iron-clad solution. It is an “inference
to the best explanation” which is, for Pierce, part of common sense logic
(note the connection to much of what the judges rely on for section 1
analysis). Much of the concern surrounding the difficulty of assessing
section 1, in my view, stems from the fact that it is necessarily an
abductive process. Given the nature of much public policy formulation
as Choudhry noted, it is much more plausible to recognize that in many
instances there are only strong or plausible solutions, not necessary or
infallible ones. John Josephson proposes three considerations that engage
an abductive analysis and provide an assessment of the strength of an
inference:
(1) how decisively the leading hypothesis surpasses the alternatives;
(2) how well the hypothesis stands by itself, independently of the
alternatives;
(3) how thorough the search was for alternatives;
and two pragmatic considerations, including:
(4) how strong the need is to come to a conclusion at all, especially
considering the possibility of gathering further evidence before
deciding;

95

I am indebted to Eric Neilsen, a student in my “Federalism and Institutions of
Government” course, for providing me with information on Pierce’s work in this area. See Pierce on
Signs, James Hoopes, ed. (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); John Josephson,
“Symposium: Abductive Inference: On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation”
(2001) 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621.
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(5) the costs of being wrong and the rewards of being right.96
His typology is intended to apply to any form of argument or justification.
The first three, however, are directly relevant to a section 1 analysis: a
measure of reasonableness and appropriateness is only determinable in
an environment where rigorousness is crucial (particularly in the form of
assessing the extent of alternatives).
The Oakes test, particularly in the proportionality aspect, already
covers some of these considerations. Rational connection, minimal
impairment and benefits/burdens provide a method of assessment that
weighs one option against others. However, Josephson’s third component,
that of thoroughness, is not always present. One might argue that the
purpose of the minimal impairment test is to provide for an assessment
of alternative approaches to a particular policy. This is true. It does not
necessarily, however, give guidance as to how thorough the search was.
The adversarial system may provide some checks and balances, but is it
sufficient? Examples of questions that could be employed to assess a
government’s justification under section 1 include: What is the evidence
that all plausible justifications have been considered? How deep is the
lawyer’s/court’s experience in this area? How often have abductions in
this area turned out to be mistaken because of novel phenomena? Has
the possibility been considered that some givens are incorrect? Or that
data merely appeared to be true? Has the possibility been considered that
justifications based on materials/information from past experience may
not be adequate to the current situation?97
As with the best evidence rule described earlier, requiring this to be
an overt step in the Oakes analysis could help reduce the difficulties
Choudhry highlights in the Court’s divergence of opinion over section 1
evidence. In Bryan, for example, the Court’s reluctance to examine the
staggering influence of technology and new forms of communication
showed a lack of thoroughness that, as I have attempted to argue above,
was significant and damaging to its ultimate conclusion. It is certainly
not clear from the decision that the Court regarded the possibility that
the Lortie Commission report is of less relevance in the electronic age.
Moreover, by going through such an exercise, legitimacy will be
enhanced because a court, in explicitly adverting to the thoroughness of
evidence collected for the Oakes test, will better appreciate the
96
97

See Josephson, id., at 1626.
I have modified these questions from a set proposed by Josephson, id., at 1630.
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importance of finding the best available evidence, and will, one would
hope, be more aware of the need for law to be cognizant of current
trends.98

IV. CONCLUSION
In a country with multiple time zones such as Canada, virtually any
attempt to control the publication of election results will result in
conflicts over freedom of expression. The 1991 Lortie Commission
canvassed a number of approaches to dealing with this problem. It did
not, however, recommend any changes to the ban on publication of
election results across time zones. In R. v. Bryan the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld that law. It did so, as I have argued, without much
appreciation of the difficulties such a law poses in the electronic age we
are now living through.
There is no easy answer to this issue. The need to best preserve
freedom of expression obviously needs to be considered, however.
Staggered opening hours for polls across the country goes some way
towards alleviating the problem. It still leaves the western provinces
exposed to receiving early results from Atlantic Canada. One way out of
this dilemma, which would also be safe from technological circumvention,
is to have an embargo period after polls close so that results would not
be made available until, for example, 11p.m. in Atlantic Canada. This
would allow each region to be treated as equally as possible. It would
not favour those who have access to resources and political connections
who are able to obtain results before the masses. It would prevent
websites or social networking sites from posting. At the same time, there
would not be a breach of anyone’s section 2(b) right, as without
information, there can be no expression (which may be small consolation
for those in the east who feel they have a right to know their election
results as soon as possible, or those who worry that delayed election
results are signs not of democracy but autocracy). Besides, it may even

98
It should be noted that Josephson’s final two considerations are less important in the
judicial realm since courts (particularly those at the apex of the court system such as the Supreme
Court of Canada) must come to a conclusion and do not typically engage in self-analysis of their
decisions.

114

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

teach all of us the benefits of a virtue that is in short supply these days:
patience.99

99
I like the McLachlin Court’s acknowledgment of the law as an educative, pedagogical
tool: the best example for me is Sauvé, supra, note 80, where the majority explores in great detail
the message that prisoner voting laws sends to both prisoners and the general public alike.

